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SUPERIOR COURT
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
SAN BERNARDINO JUSTICE CENTER
247 West Third Street
San Bernardino, California 92415
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, SAN BERNARDINO JUSTICE CENTER
MAIA PAWOOSKAR,
Plainfiff,
vs.
REDLANDS UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive,
Respondent.
Case No.: CIVDS1314338
TRIAL COURT RULING ON PETITION
FOR WRIT OF MANDATE; INJUNCTION
AND DECLATORY RELIEF
Hon. Bryan Foster
Department: S-35
Trial Date: September 19, 2014
I. Background
On November 27, 2013, Petitioner Maia Pawooskar filed this writ petition and complaint against Respondent District for violation of PRA and a taxpayer action to enjoin illegal expenditure of public funds. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a.)
The Petition alleges the parties have a disagreement regarding Ms. Pawooskar's minor son's entitlement to certain special education services. Petitioner believes the District was spending a disproportionate amount of resources to resist her request for special education services for her son leading to litigation. In one action, in which the District was represented by attorney Vivian R. Billups, Ms. Billups submitted a declaration attesting that the District incurred [2] $425.00 for her work done for the District's opposition to Ms. Pawooskar's request for a continuance. To investigate her concerns, on March 27, 2013, she submitted a PRA request to Superintendent Lori Rhodes via email which included the following:
This is a request for records pursuant to the provisions of the California Public Records Act as amended (Cal. Gov. Code § 6250, et seq.). This is a request for copies of all records prepared, owned; used, or retained by Redlands Unified School District of the following:
1. Minutes of the Board of Education Meeting held on March 12, 2013.
(These items were provided and are not at issue.)
2. Fiscal Year 2012, 2013 Vendor Payables History for any and all legal service providers, including but not limited to Vivian E. Billups, towards OAH 012050091, OAH 2012061088, OAH 2013020305, OAH 2013030602.
3. Vendor Payables History for any and all legal service providers, including but not limited to Vivian E. Billups and other Law firms that the District retained against my son, Som K. Pawooskar (DOB: 2/17/1997) since his entry into Redlands Unified School district in Fiscal Year 2000 to current Fiscal Year 2013-14.
When petitioner did not receive a response she followed up by attending a Board of Education meeting on April 9, 2013 and spoke during the public comment period, alerting them to the failed response. Petitioner sent copies of the original PRA request two more times.
The District responded on May 2, 2013, indicating that it had conducted an extensive search and that there were no responsive documents except for a single-page invoice dated March 31, 2012 showing charges of $153.25 from Ms. Billups' firm which was attached. Petitioner contacted the District to ask why there were no additional records (e.g. records reflecting the $425.00 charge) and was ultimately told to contact attorney Billups directly about her billing practices.
The District's May 2, 2013 response denying possession of any attorney billing records was technically true. However, the reason there were no bills was because Redlands Unified School District was (and is) a participating member of the East Valley Special Education Local [3] Plan Area ("EVSELPA") which handled the provision of legal services for special needs lawsuits.1
At this point, Ms. Pawooskar hired counsel to assist her, and on June 28, 2013, attorney Kelly Aviles contacted the District on petitioner's behalf regarding the PRA request, reiterating the two requests for vendor payable history for legal service providers. On July 2, 2013, Superintendent Rhodes responded that Ms. Billups "has not billed the RUSD for her services, nor has any attorney or law firm billed the District for legal services" related to petitioner's PRA request.
Attorney Aviles sent a second, much more expansive PRA request to the District on July 9, 2013 which included eleven categories of documents and specifically requested in Item #3: "All documents showing any agreement between Redlands Unified School District and any party to provide legal services on behalf of Redlands Unified School District. This includes, but is not limited to East Valley Special Education Local Plan Area."2
After requesting a fourteen-day extension to respond, the District indicated on August 2, 2013 that it had an estimated 11,180 responsive pages of records and required Ms. Pawooskar to pay $2,795.00 for copies. Petitioner objected to the $0.25 per page charge and indicated she preferred to view the records instead. The District responded by stating Ms. Pawooskar could only review 164 pages free-of-charge because the remaining 11,014 pages incurred duplication costs of $2,753.50 to redact non-disclosable information and petitioner needed to pay these [4] copy costs before the District would allow her to view the redacted pages. Petitioner refused. After several letters back and forth, petitioner reviewed the non-privileged documents on October 9, 2013.
On October 31, 2013, Ms. Pawooskar submitted a third PRA request to the District related to a more recent administrative hearing. The District indicated petitioner could inspect seventeen pages but the remaining 23 pages needed to be redacted and copying costs would be $4.60 (at a reduced rate of $0.20 per page). Petitioner viewed the four pages available [of the seventeen pages referenced] and paid for copies of the redacted copies under protest on November 14, 2013. She contends however no legal basis exists for the redactions and that the copy costs asserted by the District exceeded the "direct costs" authorized by Section 6253, subdivision (b).
The present petition was filed November 27, 2013. Petitioner contends the "mandatory charge" to view redacted copies is unauthorized under the statute and that there is no basis for the $0.25 per page copy cost. An opposition and reply were filed and argument was heard on September 19, 2014 after which the matter was taken under submission.
II. Controlling Authority - Writ of Mandate
Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a) grants any court the power to issue a writ of mandate to "any interior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person." The writ must be issued in cases where there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.)
If an agency acts in its ordinary legislative authority, review of its action is by ordinary mandamus. That is, the court confines itself to a determination of whether the agency's action is "arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in evidentiary support." (Shapell Industries, Inc. v. [5] Governing Board (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 218, 230 (citing Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514-15).)
Although "arbitrary and capricious" has no precise meaning, courts have indicated it includes conduct that is not supported by a fair or substantial reason or a stubborn insistence on following an unauthorized course of action. (A.B.C. Federation of Teachers v. A.B.C. Unified School Dist. (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 332, 343; Madonna v. County of San Louis Obispo (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 57, 61-62; Stewart v. State Personnel Board (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 445, 447.)
An agency's action lacks evidentiary support if its decision is not supported by substantial evidence. (Taylor Bus. Serv. v. San Diego Board of Educ. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1331, 1340.) As the California Supreme Court stated, "Substantial evidence is not any evidence -- it must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value." (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 51.)
A. Judicial Notice
"Judicial notice" is the court's recognition of the existence of a matter of law or fact without the necessity of formal proof. (See Evid Code, § 450 et seq.) "Judicial notice is . . . better described as a substitute for formal proof, 'a judicial shortcut, a doing away . . . with the formal necessity for evidence'." (Gravert v. DeLuse (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 576, 580; Varcoe v. Lee (1919) 180 Cal. 338, 344.)
Petitioner seeks judicial notice of numerous documents including a California Attorney General Opinion (Exh. EE), the Attorney General's Summary of the PRA (Exh. FF), the California Department of Justice's Guidelines for Access to Public Records (Exh. GG), the City of Redlands Unified School District Polices and Redland City's Resolution & Staff Report (Exhs. AA-DD), various Legislative Acts related to S.B. 143 [Kopp] (Exh. II), and an Arizona Attorney General's Opinion [dealing with a similar issue] (Exh. HH).
Although these items have limited value to the analysis, there is no objection and judicial notice is granted.
[6] III. California Public Records Act (PRA)
Government Code section 62503 provides that the Legislature, mindful of the right of individuals, "finds and declares that access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state." (See also Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 425 ["The CPRA ... was enacted for the purpose of increasing freedom of information by giving members of the public access to information in the possession of public agencies."].) Similarly, California Constitution, Art. I, §3(b)(1) provides, "The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny."
To implement the right set forth above, the PRA provides that public records are open to inspection during the office hours of the state or local agency, and every person has a right to inspect any public record. (§ 6253, subd. (a).) Additionally, unless exempt from disclosure by an express provision of law "each state or local agency, upon a request for a copy of records that reasonably describes an identifiable record or records, shall make the records promptly available to any person upon payment of fees covering direct costs of duplication, or a statutory fee if applicable. Upon request an exact copy shall be provided unless impracticable to do so." (§ 6253, subd. (b).) The procedure upon a request for disclosure of a public record4 is set forth in Section 6253, subdivision (c).
Generally, all public records are subject to disclosure, unless the PRA expressly provides otherwise. (American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 66 ["Legislative policy favors disclosure."].) Nothing in the PRA "shall be construed to permit an agency to delay or obstruct the inspection or copying of records." (§ 6253, subd. (d).)
[7] Moreover, under Section 6253.1, subdivision (a), when a person requests to inspect a public record or obtain a copy of the public record, the agency should assist the member to make a focused and effective request. Such is accomplished by the public agency, to extent reasonable under the circumstances, assisting the member in identifying records and information that are responsive to the request or the purpose of the request, describing the information technology and physical location in which records exist, and providing suggestions to overcome any practical basis for denying access. (§ 6253.1, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
If a public agency fails to comply or claims an exemption, the requestor may institute a proceeding for injunction, declaratory relief, or writ of mandate in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce his/her right to inspect or to receive a copy of any public record. (§ 6258.) The government agency opposing disclosure under PRA bears the burden of providing that one or more exemption applies. (ACLU of Northern California, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 67.)
ISSUES PRESENTED
In the present writ of mandate, petitioner contends the District's policies violate the California Public Records Act because: (1) the District has no right to demand payment for copies in order for the public to inspect records; (2) the $0.25 per page copy charge exceeds the "direct cost" of duplication; and (3) the District has not justified its claim that any of the requested documents require redaction [at the petitioner's expense or otherwise]. Petitioner contends the District's policies violate both the PRA and Civil Code section 526a (wasteful government action challenge).
Both sides represent to the court that this is an issue of first impression. Stated simply, the primary issue is whether a public agency may pass the cost of redaction on to a party wishing to view public records under Section 6253, subdivision (a). Additionally, is the charge of $0.25 per page (for making copies) reasonable?
A. Statutory Interpretation Standard
As set forth in People v. Bhasin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 461, this court has precise rules to follow in statutory interpretation:
[8] "'[I]n construing a statute, a court [must] ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' [Citation.]" (People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151 [].) In determining that intent, we first examine the words of the statute, applying "'their usual, ordinary, and common sense meaning based upon the language ... used and the evident purpose for which the statute was adopted.'" (People v. Granderson (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 703, 707 [], quoting In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 155 [].) '"If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, "then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs." [Citation.] "Where the statute is clear, courts will not 'interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist.' [Citation.]"' [Citation.]" (Coronado, at p. 151.) If the words of the statute are ambiguous, a court may resort to "extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history." (Ibid.) Applying these rules of statutory interpretation, a court "must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
(People v. Bhasin, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 469.)
In the present case, this court is guided not only by the language of the statute, but by our state's highest authority as well, the California Constitution. As explained in BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742:
In 2004, California voters approved Proposition 59, which enshrined in our state Constitution the public's right to access records of public agencies. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b).) ... The amendment requires the Public Records Act to "be broadly construed if it furthers the people's right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of access." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b), par. (2).) Such was the law prior to the amendment's enactment. (California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc., v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 810, 831 [].)
(BRV, Inc., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 750-751.)
The relevant portion of our state Constitution provides:
(b)
(1) The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.
[9] (2) A statute, court rule, or other authority, including those in effect on the effective date of this subdivision, shall be broadly construed if it furthers the people's right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of access. A statute, court rule, or other authority adopted after the effective date of this subdivision that limits the right of access shall be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b) [all emphases added].)
Under the foregoing, the intent of the California PRA is crystal clear: when in doubt, the court is to err on the side of the people's right of access and any attempt to limit access (such as requiring the people to pay a public agency to make copies in order to redact information before permitting "free" viewing of the documents) must not only be "narrowly construed" but also must have express "findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b).)
Violation of California Public Records Act - Issue 1
Charge to VIEW Redacted Copies of Records
The main argument focuses upon the District's demand for petitioner to pay copy costs in order to view redacted records. (The petition does not challenge the claims of privilege or exempt material asserted by the District with respect to the records requiring redaction.)5
[10] The District indicated that the only way to accomplish the redaction (i.e. segregation of material exempted from disclosure) was to make copies of the pages containing both disclosable and non-disclosable information. As the redaction required copies, and it is permissible to charge for copies under Section 6253, subdivision (b), the District contends its policy of requiring the petitioner to pay to view the redacted copies of records was authorized under the PRA.
Petitioner disagrees, arguing the District's policy violates the intent of the PRA, and specifically Section 6253, subdivision (a), which was to provide a no-cost alternative to citizens wishing to review public records in lieu of purchasing copies (as provided under subdivision (b)). By instituting a pay-per-view procedure for viewing redacted copies, the District has effectively eliminated subdivision (a)'s no-cost option.
The two provisions at issue are found in Section 6253 subdivisions (a) and (b) which provide:
(a) Public records are open to inspection at all times during the office hours of the state or local agency and every person has a right to inspect any public record, except as hereafter provided. Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be available for inspection by any person requesting the record after deletion of the portions that are exempted by law.
(b) Except with respect to public records exempt from disclosure by express provisions of law, each state or local agency, upon a request for a copy of records that reasonably describes an identifiable record or records, shall make the records promptly available to any person upon payment of fees covering direct costs of duplication, or a statutory fee if applicable. Upon request, an exact copy shall be provided unless impracticable to do so.
(Bold added.)
As Section 6253, subdivision (a) is intended to provide the public open access to an agency's records, it should be "broadly construed" to further that access, not the contrary. Furthermore, our Constitution admonishes that if this court were to issue a decision limiting access [e.g. by requiring payment of copy costs to view records], such a holding would require "findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and [11] the need for protecting that interest." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2).) This is a heavy burden.
Upon learning of the volume of documents, and increased cost for copies, petitioner indicated she would prefer to view/inspect the 11,180 responsive records instead obtaining copies. In short, petitioner switched her request from one made under Section 6253, subdivision (b) [copies of documents], to one made under Section 6253, subdivision (a) [viewing documents]. This is the "free" option.6 Section 6253, subdivision (a) does not provide for any payment of costs.7
Here, petitioner is not requesting copies of the records; hence, Section 6253, subdivision (b) is not at issue. The District's reliance on this provision to authorize copy costs is misguided. The unambiguous language of the statute shows it is inapplicable to the present case.
The District cites several decisions holding that a public agency's duty to provide public records may require redaction even though such redaction may impose a burden upon the agency. (See e.g., A.C.L.U. v. Superior Court, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th 55; State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 1177; A.C.L.U. v. Deukmejian (1982) 32 Cal.3d 440.) It contends that the threshold question, to be made on a case-by-case basis, is whether the burden and cost of preparing (and redacting) documents is so onerous as to outweigh the public interest in disclosure, citing Northern California Police Practices Project v. Craig (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 116. However, none of the District's cases hold the petitioner should pay for the costs of redaction, which in this case includes copy costs. In fact, the Craig court expressly stated the burden of separating exempt material before making documents available for public inspection would be charged to the public entities until the Legislature addressed the matter:
We conclude that where nonexempt materials are not inextricably intertwined with exempt materials and are otherwise reasonably segregable therefrom, [12] segregation is required to serve the objective of the PRA to make public records available for public inspection and copying unless a particular statute makes them exempt. (Cook v. Craig, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 783.)
Undoubtedly, the requirement of segregation casts a tangible burden on governmental agencies and the judiciary. Nothing less will suffice, however, if the underlying legislative policy of the PRA favoring disclosure is to be implemented faithfully. If the burden becomes too onerous, relief must be sought from the Legislature.
(Craig, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 124 [bold added].)
Under the Craig court's reasoning, the District's chosen process of making copies in order to redact exempt information would be part of the "segregation" cost borne by the District prior to making a document available for public inspection. The Craig court commented it was up to the Legislature to address the costs and burdens placed upon public agencies. In the ensuing thirty-five years, our Legislature has expanded the public's right of access and increased the responsibilities of the public agencies, including curtailing their ability to seek reimbursement for costs through fees. As noted in 1994, "the trend has been to limit, rather than to broaden, the base upon which the fee may be calculated." (North County Parents Organization for Children with Special Needs v. Department of Education (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 144, 147.)8
In view of this trend, the District's argument that the public must help carry the financial burden and pay a fee to view documents which the public entity contends have segregable disclosable and non-disclosable information is not supportable.
District also argues it would be overly burdensome for it to comply with the PRA requests unless it were permitted to recoup its direct copy costs associated with the redaction efforts and contends it could deny petitioner's request to inspect altogether "on the basis that redacting over 11,000 pages of documents was 'so onerous as to clearly outweigh public interest in disclosure.' (A.C.L.U. v. Deukmejian, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 452.)" However, our [13] Legislature has not shifted restricted public access to public records despite decades of case law acknowledging significant burdens such access places on the agencies.
It should also be noted the District has an obligation under Section 6253.1 to assist members of the public to make focused and effective requests. To the extent the PRA requests elicited over 11,000 pages of mostly exempt documents; assistance with making more focused requests is indicated and ordered by the court.
California Public Records Act - Issue 2
$0.25 Per Page Copy Fee - "Direct Costs" of Duplication
The second issue addresses the $0.25 per page copy fee. Petitioner claims the fee is excessive and exceeds the "direct costs" of duplication the District is permitted to charge under Government Code section 6253, subdivision (b).9 Prior to the filing of this writ petition, the only explanation for the fee was the District's counsel's statement that the $0.25 sum was "based on experience."
The District the offered to reduce this amount to $0.20 per page due to the "high volume" of responsive documents (over 11,000) but then also applied the discounted rate to the 23 copies provided in response to petitioner's October 31, 2013, PRA request, leaving the basis for the high volume discount unclear.
Petitioner challenges the copy charge amount because previously the District charged her $0.10 per page for copies of her son's records. The District explained in correspondence to petitioner it "has established a charge of $0.25 per page for copies of non-student records and a charge of $0.10 per page for parents requesting copies of student records for their children." Petitioner contends the increased cost for PRA copies is not supported. She is correct.
The law is clear, only "direct costs" of copying are recoverable under Section 6253, subdivision (b). In North County Parents Organization v. Department of Education, supra, 23 [14] Cal.App.4th 144, the court traced the Legislature's use of "direct cost" in Section 6257 [the precursor to 6253] and explained" "[t]he direct cost of duplication is the cost of running the copy machine, and conceivably also the expense of the person operating it. 'Direct cost' does not include the ancillary tasks necessarily associated with the retrieval, inspection and handling of the file from which the copy is extracted." (North County Parents, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.)
As shown above, the record contains correspondence showing the District charges $0.10 per page to make copies of student records. The only evidence provided by the District to support an increase in the cost for making copies from $0.10 to $0.25 appears in the declaration of Brad Mason, the Assistant Superintendent of Business Services of Redlands Unified School District who claims to be familiar with the copy costs associated with PRA requests and states:
5. Public Records Act requests submitted to the District are processed by senior classified management staff in the District's Business Services, Human Resources and Educational Services Department, as well as the Superintendent's Office. Based on an average of these staff members' salaries the "per copy" cost associated with operating the District's photocopy machines in order to make copies of documents is $0.19 per page. This rate does not include the time expended by these staff members in retrieving, redacting and storing records gathered in response to Public Records Act requests. (Underline added.)
The District's use of "senior classified management staff" serves no purpose except possibly to assist with the inspection of the documents to ascertain what material may be exempt from disclosure and require redaction. This is an ancillary task for which payment is not recoverable. (North County Parents, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.) Under North County Parents, the only fee available is for the person standing at the copy machine, feeding the [15] copies, refilling the paper as needed, and addressing paper jams, e.g. "operating it." (Id.) This does not require a "senior" employee.10
The District is obligated to provide evidence that is "reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value." (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 51.) This has not been done with respect to the $0.25 per page charge. The only basis for the increase in "direct costs" between the $0.10 student records and $0.25 PRA records shown by the evidence is the identity of the individuals making the copies. As using specialized employees to make copies is analogous to performing an ancillary task for which payment is not recoverable under the PRA (North County Parents, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 148), the District has not supported its policy of charging $0.25 per page for PRA copies by substantial or credible evidence. (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 51.) Consequently, the District's policy cannot stand. It is therefore ordered to cease charging $0.25 per page per copy for PRA requests under Section 6253, subdivision (b), and to instead charge the $0.10 "direct cost" of duplication.
[16] ORDER
To Redlands Unified School District, Respondent:
1) You are hereby ordered to immediately cease the following policies which violate the California Public Records Act, Government Code sections 6250 et seq.:
a) charging any fees for members of the public to view records, including those requiring redactions, requested under Government Code section 6253, subdivision (a);
b) charging fees in excess of the $0.10 direct cost per copy for copies of public records requested under Government Code section 6253, subdivision (b);
2) You are further ordered to meet and confer with petitioner in accordance with Government Code 6253.1 with respect to the responsive records to petitioner's March 27, 2013 and July 9, 2013 PRA requests, after which you:
a) Shall make available all remaining requested responsive records, including redacted copies, for viewing at no charge, pursuant to Government Code section 6253, subdivision (a);
b) Reimburse petitioner the copy costs paid in excess of $0.10 per page for the October 31, 2013, PRA request [23 pages paid @ $0.20 per page];
c) Pay petitioner attorneys' fees and costs, subject to a noticed motion.
Dated this 29th day of September, 2014
1 EVSELPA is a consortium of participating member school districts in San Bernardino County formed to provide programs and services to meet the needs of special education students. It is overseen by a board of directors made up of the participating school districts' superintendents, including Ms. Rhodes. EVSELPA provides legal support to member school districts in "due process" cases filed by special education students by contracting with attorneys for representation. These attorneys represent its member school districts in the due process cases and then submit their invoices to the EVSELPA for processing and payment. Despite Superintendent Rhodes' knowledge that the legal services provided on behalf of the District were provided by, and paid by, EVSELPA, there is no mention of this entity in any of the District's responses to petitioner's PRA requests.
2 On July 9, 2013 petitioner submitted a PRA request to EVSELPA seeking the "vendor payables history" documents (i.e., invoices and remittance) for any legal services provided to the District in the four OAH cases involving petitioner's son. The request was very similar to the original March 27, 2013 PRA request to the District. On August 9, 2013, EVSELPA responded to the request and provided petitioner with thirteen pages of documents evidencing all expenses it incurred for due process hearings during the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years.
3 All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise noted.
4 Public records mean any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. (§ 6252, subd. (e).)
5 In justifying the need to redact information and charge the petitioner for copies, the District cites to Section 6254 which "enumerates dozens of specific records exempt from disclosure" and then references the general "catch-all" provision of Section 6255 which applies to any record where the "public interest served by not making the record public clearly outweighs the public interest served by [its disclosure]." However, the District never indicates which of the "dozens" categories are triggered by the PRA request. "Because of the strong public policy in favor of disclosure of public records, such records must be disclosed unless they come within one or more of the categories of documents exempt from compelled disclosure. (§ 6254.) These exemptions are construed narrowly, and the burden is on the public agency to show that the records should not be disclosed." (Rogers v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 469, 476 [footnote omitted; citing San Gabriel Tribune v Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 762, 773.])
In support of its right to redact, the District cites to American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55 and State Board of Equalization v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1177, both of which acknowledge the existence of procedures used when documents (or portions of documents) are withheld from disclosure. A strict burden is placed upon the agency to justify nondisclosure because the effect of an agency's claim of an exemption means that information is withheld from the public. (A.C.L.U. v. Superior Court, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 84-85.) Although government agencies are entitled to a presumption of reasonable and good faith compliance with PRA requests (id. at p. 85) this presumption is tempered by the statutory duties placed upon the agencies and the need for compliance to be shown.
6 See California Attorney General "Summary of California Public Records Act, Exh. EE, pp. 4-5.
7 "Public records are open to inspection at all times during the office hours of the state or local agency and every person has a right to inspect any public record, except as hereafter provided. Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be available for inspection by any person requesting the record after deletion of the portions that are exempted by law." (§ 6253, subd. (a).)
8 The facts of this case are discussed in detail in Argument C. 25¢ Per Page Copy Fee - "Direct Costs of Duplication," infra.
9 (b) Except with respect to public records exempt from disclosure by express provisions of law, each state or local agency, upon a request for a copy of records that reasonably describes an identifiable record or records, shall make the records promptly available to any person upon payment of fees covering direct costs of duplication, or a statutory fee if applicable. Upon request, an exact copy shall be provided unless impracticable to do so. (Bold added.)
Both sides agree that there is no statutory fee applicable here.
10 The District also failed to support the $0.06 non-labor materials charge for copies. Mr. Mason's declaration lacked factual support and was rebutted by petitioner's evidentiary showing of paper costs, toner yields, etc. which resulted is a significantly lower number ($0.0128). However, contrary to petitioner's representation, the purchase price of copy machines was not excluded by the North County Parents court, and such costs [depreciated over time] appear appropriate to include as part of the direct costs. These purchase charges/depreciation rates were not included in petitioner's calculations.